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Abstract 
 
An open research question in malware detection is 
how to accurately and reliably distinguish a malware 
program from a benign one, running on the same 
machine. In contrast to code signatures, which are 
commonly used in commercial protection software, 
signatures derived from system calls have the potential 
to form the basis of a much more flexible defense 
mechanism. However, the performance degradation 
caused by monitoring systems calls could adversely 
impact the machine. In this paper we report our 
experimental experience in implementing API hooking 
to capture sequences of API calls. The loading time of 
ten common programs was benchmarked with three 
different settings: plain, computer with antivirus and 
computer with API hook. Results suggest that the 
performance of this technique is sufficient to provide a 
viable approach to distinguishing between benign and 
malware code execution.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
System call tracing or Applications Programming 
Interface (API) hooking is a technique that looks for 
the use of APIs, trapping calls invoked by each 
program. In intrusion detection and malware detection 
research, system calls has been used as an option for 
the source of data analysis. It is believed that malware 
will generate sequences of API calls that differ from 
benign programs. Also, it is assumed that for a set of 
malware which shares common malicious behavior and 
method of propagation, there is a concise set of 
sequences of API calls generated by malware which 
could be used to detect them all. The accuracy of the 
detection mechanism is subject to the effectiveness of 
the detection algorithm.  
In this paper we investigate the speed penalty 
imposed on a computer which has API hooking 
mechanism as compared to a computer without it. This 
is part of our larger research[1] towards improving the 
effectiveness of the malware detection technique using 
sequences of API calls.  
 
2. Problem Statement 
 
Intrusion detection research has employed analysis 
based on various sources such as audit trails, network 
traffic and kernel API calls [2]. In malware detection 
research, a number of solutions has been attempted 
including checksum, heuristic, integrity shell, string 
checker, system call tracing, machine emulators, logic 
analyzers, network sniffers, software certification etc 
[3],[4]. Each solution has its strengths and weaknesses.  
As reported in the Microsoft Developer Network 
site [5], hooking operating system’s (OS) APIs would 
hamper the performance of the OS. Thus, it has been 
suggested to minimize the number of hooks to achieve 
the hooking goal while preserving a reasonable 
computer performance. Ritcher[6] suggested that there 
are seven ways to inject a Dynamic Linked Library 
(DLL) as a means of monitoring systems calls. One of 
the techniques implemented in [7] which replaced an 
Internet Explorer’s real DLL with a bogus one. The 
fake DLL relays messages sent from and to the original 
DLL. Doing it that way, they can analyze and log the 
message pattern of the safe system calls. Forrest et al. 
[8] fragmented long API calls into several shorter API 
calls signatures. They looked for similar patterns in the  
shorter sequences of system calls in code execution. 
Yangfang et al. [9] recorded all API calls attempts and 
generated API calls signature. The signature also 
contains detailed information such as total number of 
called functions made by that process. They estimated 
a level of confidence to indicate whether a particular 
sequence falls into the category of malicious or not, 
employing a detection process called association rule 
based classification. Other work presented in [4] 
monitored several potential APIs used by malware 
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such as registry, file system, scripting host, system and 
communication APIs. Changes made by programs are 
tracked and recorded so that it can be undone should 
malicious API calls be detected later.  
The aim of this paper is to report the performance of 
a computer that has a mechanism that traps API calls 
invoked by programs. We benchmarked computer 
performance by running programs with three different 
settings:  
1. plain  
2. computer with antivirus 
3. computer with API hook program 
We ran ten programs at our test machine. We 
recorded the loading time of the programs without 
antivirus and API hook programs. We also recorded 
the loading time of the programs which had antivirus 
installed. We also recorded the loading time of a 
program that has a set of API hooks being 
implemented. Our objective is to see whether API 
hooks hamper computer performance or not in a given 
context of a limited number of hooks. We also would 
like to measure how far the performance differs 
between a computer that has the latest version of the 
popular antivirus installed and a computer that only has 
a set of API hooks. While making that statement, note 
that we do not hook all functions in the OS’s API. We 
only select a number of functions of our choice from 
kernel32.dll as listed in the next section. Also, even 
though the antivirus program uses file signature based 
detection technique, it might implement some API 
hooks as well but such details are not made public. As 
such, the outcome of this experiment is desirable for us 
and others to know. 
This paper attempts to answer the following 
questions:  
1. Does a hooked program run slower than a plain 
program?  
2. Does a program execute slower in a computer that 
has signature and heuristic based detection 
antivirus than in a computer that does not have 
one? 
3. Does a computer that has a hooking program 
(without antivirus program installed) run slower 
than a computer that has an antivirus program? 
 
3. Experiment Planning & Operation 
 
As it was reported earlier that implementing API 
hooks tended to slow a computer performance, we 
presumed that hooking causes a computer to perform 
slower than a computer without one. We tested this 
with ten programs that are widely used by many users. 
The programs are:  
1. Ms Word 2003 
2. Ms Excel 2003 
3. Ms Outlook 2003 
4. Mozilla Firefox 3.0 
5. Internet Explorer 7 (IE) 
6. Windows Media Player 11 (M.Player) 
7. Winamp 5.54 
8. Yahoo Messenger 8.1 (YM) 
9. Windows Live Messenger 8.5 (Live) 
10. Age of The Empires II Trial (AOE2) 
The environment used for the test consists of a 
machine with Intel(R) Pentium(R) M processor 1600 
MHz, 512 MB RAM and 40 GB hard disk. Windows 
XP SP2 installed on the machine.  
Prior to running every experiment, the physical and 
Virtual PCs’ hard disk was defragmented as necessary. 
This step is essential to avoid the hard disk’s 
fragmented disk surface becoming the actual cause of 
performance degradation. Enabling the hooking 
mechanism, we created our hook program [1] written 
in C#.NET in Visual Studio 2008. We utilized a 
framework that eased the hooking efforts. The 
framework could be obtained at [10]. The advantage of 
using the framework was that we could quickly 
develop the hooking program. We also used AutoIt 
v3[11] to help us automate the execution process.  
For all of the programs, we measured the time in 
seconds starting from the moment the program was 
executed until its graphical user interface became an 
active window. Each program executed thirty rounds 
with several second intervals between each execution. 
The whole process was then repeated two more times, 
giving three sets of 30 rounds for each program, in 
order to assess the consistency of the results. It turned 
out that results from three repetitions were generally 
consistent. This is important because if we had to do 
more repetitions it would be very time consuming. The 
tests involved many file creations and deletions, which 
required frequent disk defragmentation before 
subsequent tests.  
We were interested to report the time differences 
that occurred throughout the 30 rounds for those three 
settings. In this way we benchmarked the computers 
performance with three different settings namely plain, 
computer with antivirus and computer with API hook 
program that logs the API functions’ name, discarding 
the numerous parameters returned from each 
invocation. For each program, we prepared a script to 
launch the program and close it back when its GUI 
became activated. The program was hooked as soon as 
it was executed. The hooking program detected the 
existence of the target executable by monitoring its 
memory space created in the memory.  
At this stage, we only opted to hook kernel32.dll. 
Kernel32.dll contains the OS’s core functions for many 
basic operations. Our interests were only the functions 
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related to create, open, move, delete and replace file 
operations. We were interested to monitor the socket 
based API which allows network communications. We 
were also interested to capture registry operations, 
since a large number of malware programs hook into 
the registry. These operations are provided by 
advapi32.dll, but the last two were not included in this 
experiment for simplicity. The following is the list of 
functions of interest: 
 
Kernel32.dll 
1. CopyFileA 
2. CopyFileExA 
3. CopyFileExW 
4. CopyFileW 
5. CreateFileA 
6. CreateFileW 
7. DeleteFileA 
8. DeleteFileW 
9. MoveFileA 
10. MoveFileExA 
11. MoveFileExW 
12. MoveFileW 
13. MoveFileWithProgressA 
14. MoveFileWithProgressW 
15. OpenFile 
16. ReadFile 
17. ReadFileEx 
18. ReadFileScatter 
19. ReplaceFile 
20. ReplaceFileA 
21. ReplaceFileW 
22. WriteFile 
23. WriteFileEx 
24. WriteFileGather 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The test outcome could not avoid outliers. We 
defined outliers as a performance record in a particular 
round that extremely deviated from other rounds. On 
the assumption that the appearance of outliers is caused 
by the interruption of another program, when we 
encountered an outlier we simply reran the whole 30 
rounds tests for that particular program again. This 
gives the cleanest data from which to determine the 
relative timing of the three different settings. 
The outcome of the experiment was an interesting 
discovery. Regardless whether the computer had plain, 
antivirus or hook setting, all programs took a longer 
time during their first round of execution up to its GUI 
activation (See Table 1). However, a computer with 
antivirus and hook caused delay at the first round to 
become much longer. Also, in all cases, the antivirus 
caused more delay than hooking at the first round (See 
Table 2).  
We conclude that computer does not really perform 
well when it runs a program at the first round upon 
reboot. Apparently the computer requires more time to 
launch that program. Assume the following scenario to 
help understanding this fact. Upon reboot, we ran MS 
Word. The software took more time to execute as 
compared to its subsequent execution. Without 
rebooting the computer, we then ran MS Excel. The 
program also experienced a delay during its first run. 
We also manually ran the software (without the help of 
autoit3 script) involving 30 rounds with 30 minutes 
interval between each round. It remains consistent that 
the first run took longer than the remaining 29 rounds 
for most programs.  
 
Table 1: First run performance (in seconds) 
Program Plain Antivirus Hook 
Ms Word 1.71 4.88 4.65 
Ms Excel 1.22 1.74 1.67 
Ms Outlook 3.86 7.31 6.71 
Firefox 3.19 4.89 4.09 
IE 2.82 5.04 3.90 
M.Player 1.27 3.12 1.49 
Winamp 2.66 4.93 2.27 
YM 2.30 4.36 2.84 
LIVE 2.42 3.22 2.44 
AOE2 2.19 2.76 2.26 
 
Table 2: First run as a percentage of plain 
Program AVG Hook 
Word 284.86% 271.44% 
Excel 142.63% 136.91% 
Outlook 189.49% 173.98% 
Firefox 153.15% 128.05% 
IE 178.48% 138.07% 
M.Player 245.33% 116.83% 
Winamp 185.12% 85.31% 
YM 185.12% 106.57% 
LIVE 1.33% 1.01% 
AOE2 125.66% 103.11% 
 
Exclusively, the tests on Winamp and IE showed 
that a delay in a computer with antivirus is more than 
the penalty occurred in a computer with hook 
throughout 30 rounds. Also, when we ran Winamp in 
computer with antivirus, it did not run at a flat speed. 
The same experience happened to AOE2 and YM with 
hooking. These facts can be seen from their coefficient 
of variation. Coefficient of variation is defined as the 
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ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. Although 
initially we assumed that they were outliers, we 
obtained similar outcomes when they were retested for 
several times.  
We considered a plain computer as a base for 
benchmarking. The delay in a computer with antivirus 
and hook were measured in percentage relative to the 
base.  
 
Table 3: 30 rounds running variances (in 
seconds) 
App Plain Antivirus Hook 
 Mean Std Dev Mean 
Std 
Dev Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Word 0.42 0.25 0.98 0.74 1.06 0.68 
Excel 0.37 0.16 0.40 0.25 0.94 0.14 
Outlook 0.84 0.57 1.33 1.13 1.33 0.99 
Firefox 0.79 0.45 0.88 0.76 1.83 0.46 
IE 0.78 0.39 1.89 0.60 1.28 0.50 
M.Player 0.41 0.16 0.48 0.50 0.89 0.12 
Winamp 0.56 0.40 2.95 0.51 1.12 0.22 
YM 0.66 0.32 0.75 0.68 1.57 0.39 
LIVE 0.61 0.34 0.66 0.48 1.18 0.24 
AOE2 0.42 0.25 0.98 0.74 1.06 0.68 
 
Throughout 30 rounds running, we observed the 
running performance of the computer with those three 
different settings (See Table 3). A plain computer and 
a computer that has the antivirus ran mostly at a 
consistent speed. However, a computer that has API 
hook program ran inconsistently. This can be observed 
in a higher number of its coefficient of variation while 
the computer with antivirus has a smaller value.  
A similar test was conducted at a different computer 
and the same result patterns were still obtained. The 
machine has Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3.2 GHz HT 
processor with 512 MB RAM and 80 GB hard disk. 
We used Ms Virtual PC installed with Windows XP 
SP2 on top of existing Windows XP SP2 installed on 
the physical machine. It is clear that hook causes delay 
at all times, but is a bit better than antivirus at the first 
run. Figure 1 shows one of the outcomes conducted on 
MS Word.  
The speeds between the three different computer 
settings were compared. Exclusively for the first run 
test, the plain computer ran the fastest followed by the 
computer with hook and computer with antivirus. 
Nevertheless, some programs performed slowest in 
API hook environment. The speed and performance of 
the machine used also contributed to the speed of the 
experimental process. The relevant point to note was 
their performance difference ratios. 
 
 
Figure 1. MS Word loading performance 
 
The results obtained from the experiments suggest 
that API hook is a suitable option to look for malware 
detection without much worrying about performance 
penalty. Result obtained can be interpreted as the first 
run always slower that the subsequent execution. Also, 
the plain computer ran the fastest followed mostly by 
the computer with hook and computer with antivirus 
exclusively at first run.  
The specific timings would be expected to vary on 
computers with different specifications. However, we 
have seen the same patterns concerning first vs 
subsequent executions, on all three test settings (plain, 
computer with antivirus and computer with API hook), 
across all repetitions, and on two different computers. 
Therefore we believe that these observations are true in 
general. 
From our experiment using API hooking, we found 
that different programs had different API execution 
sequences. Some programs had a high number of a 
particular function invocation while others did not use 
it at all. This could be due to the variety in software 
features and the different programming language and 
algorithm used. Whatever the cause, it gives some 
support to the idea that API calls might be the basis of 
a signature for recognizing an application, and hence 
perhaps malware. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We are conducting research into whether looking 
for patterns in sequences of API calls can be an 
effective way of distinguishing between benign and 
malware code execution. As a step in this process, we 
have presented a technique for API hooking that avoids 
the high overhead associated with trapping all API 
calls by focusing on selected ones.  
We conducted experiments into the performance of 
this technique. Our objective was to understand the 
relative performance of three scenarios based on 
running on a plain computer, a computer with antivirus 
software and a computer with an API hook program. 
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Results suggest that optimized API hooking does 
not impose much burden on the performance of a 
computer. The burden is similar to that imposed by the 
tested commercial antivirus software. We conclude 
from this that it is feasible to investigate API hooking 
for malware detection.  
Our future work includes capturing API sequences 
generated by malware. We will profile those sequences 
and utilize the profile in our malware detection engine. 
We will optimize our matching algorithm and compare 
its performance against existing similar ones used in 
similar research. We proposed Malicious Code 
Detection Inspired by Human Immune System 
(MaCDI)[1] where two detection phases were 
introduced: Adolescent and Mature Phase. The first 
phase uses a malware profile matching mechanism, 
whereas the second phase uses a program profile 
instead.  
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